PRELUDE TO FALAISE

The Allied ground forces commander, Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery, had
envisaged a theatre strategy of drawing German forces away from the US front to the
British and Canadian sector, thus preparing the way for a US breakout from
Normandy. On 25 July, while German attention was fixed firmly on the area around
Caen, General Omar Bradley launched Operation Cobra. The First United States
Army successfully ruptured the thin German lines screening Brittany,and by the end
of the third day had advanced 15 miles (24 km) south of its start line at several
points. On 30 July Avranches, at the base of the Cotentin Peninsula, was captured.
The German left flank was now wide open, and within 24 hours Patton's VIII Corps
swept across the bridge at Pontaubault into Brittany and continued south and west
through open country, almost without opposition.
Operation Lüttich

The US advance was extraordinarily rapid, and by 8 August the
city of Le Mans, the former headquarters of the German
Seventh Army, was in US hands. In the aftermath of Cobra and
concurrent British and Canadian offensives, the German army
in Normandy was reduced to such a poor condition that, as
historian Max Hastings observes, "only a few SS fanatics still
entertained hopes of avoiding defeat".  In the east the Soviet
Union's summer offensive, Operation Bagration, was underway,
and with this cataclysm engulfing Army Group Centre there was
no likelihood of reinforcements coming west. However, instead
of ordering his remaining forces in Normandy to withdraw to the
Seine River, Adolf Hitler sent a directive to
Generalfeldmarschall Günther von Kluge's Army Group B
ordering "an immediate counterattack between Mortain and
Avranches to annihilate the enemy and make contact with the
west coast of the Cotentin peninsula". Hitler demanded that
eight of von Kluge's nine available Panzer divisions be used in
the attack, but only four (one incomplete) could be relieved
from their defensive duties and made ready in time. The
German commanders protested that such an operation was
beyond the reach of their resources, but these warnings were
ignored and the counter-offensive, codenamed Operation
Lüttich, commenced on 7 August around Mortain. Initially
committed to the thrust were the 2nd, 1st SS Leibstandarte
Adolf Hitler and 2nd SS Das Reich Panzer Divisions; they
attacked with only 75 Panzer IVs, 70 Panthers and 32 self-
propelled guns between them. Forewarned through ULTRA
signals intercepts, the Allies were ready, and although fighting
continued until 13 August Operation Lüttich was essentially
over within 24 hours. Instead of relieving the German
predicament, the Mortain counterattack had driven them
deeper into the Allied embrace, and with the most formidable of
von Kluge's remaining forces now destroyed by the US First
Army the entire Normandy front was left teetering on the verge
of collapse—a possibility anticipated by Allied command.
Bradley declared: "
This is an opportunity that comes to a
commander not more than once in a century. We're about to
destroy an entire hostile army and go all the way from here to
the German border".
.
     THE BATTLE  of the FALAISE GAP

Still expecting von Kluge to withdraw his forces from the tightening Allied
noose, Montgomery had for some time been planning a "long envelopment",
by which the British and Canadians would pivot left from Falaise towards the
River Seine while the US Third Army blocked the escape route between the
Seine and Loire rivers, trapping all surviving German forces in western
France. However, in a telephone conversation on 8 August, the Supreme
Allied Commander General Dwight D. Eisenhower recommended an American
proposal for a shorter envelopment centred around Argentan. Although
Montgomery acknowledged the possibilities, both he and Patton had
misgivings; if the Allies did not take Argentan, Alençon, and Falaise quickly, a
large proportion of von Kluge's force might escape. Believing he could always
fall back on the original plan if necessary, Montgomery gave in to Bradley's
enthusiastic urging and the American proposal was adopted.

Initial thrust
Operation Tractable
Patton's Third Army, moving up from the south to form one arm of the
encirclement, made good initial progress. On 12 August Alençon was
captured, and despite von Kluge's commitment of a force he had been trying
to gather for a counterattack, the next day Major General Wade H. Haislip's
XV Corps advanced 35 miles (56 km) and strongly established itself around
Argentan, although the town itself remained in German hands. Concerned
that American troops would clash with the British, who were advancing from
the north-west, Bradley over-rode Patton's orders for a further push north
towards Falaise and halted Haislip's corps.

The formation of the Falaise Pocket, from 8–17 August 1944.With the
Americans on the southern flank heavily engaged with Panzer Group
Eberbach and the British pressing in from the north-west, it fell to the
Canadian First Army to close the trap.  Save for a limited operation by the 2nd
Canadian Infantry Division down the Laize valley on 12 and 13 August, most
of the days following Totalize were spent preparing a major set-piece attack
on Falaise, codenamed
Operation Tractable. Tractable commenced at 11:
42 on the morning of 14 August, covered by an artillery-delivered
smokescreen that mimicked the darkness of Operation Totalize.  A series of
attacks by the 4th Canadian and 1st Polish Armoured Divisions forced a
passage over the Laison River, but limited access to the crossing points over
the Dives River facilitated counterattacks by the German SS Heavy Panzer
Battalion 102.  Mainly due to navigation difficulties and poor coordination
between the ground and air forces, the first day's progress was slower than
expected.[55]

On 15 August the 2nd and 3rd Canadian Infantry Divisions, with the support
of the 2nd Canadian (Armoured) Brigade, renewed their drive south, but
progress remained slow. After harsh fighting and having weathered several
German counter-attacks, the 4th Armoured Division captured Soulangy,
although strong German resistance prevented an outright breakthrough to
Trun and the day's gains were minimal.  However, the following day the 2nd
Canadian Infantry Division broke into Falaise itself, encountering minor
opposition from Waffen SS units and scattered pockets of German infantry,
and by 17 August had secured the town.

At midday on the 16 August, von Kluge had declined Hitler's demand for
another counterattack, declaring it was utterly impossible.  A withdrawal was at
last authorized later that afternoon, but believing von Kluge intended to
surrender to the Allies, on the evening of the 17 August Hitler relieved him of
command and recalled him to Germany; von Kluge committed suicide en
route. He was succeeded by Field Marshal Walter Model, whose first act was
to order the immediate retreat of the Seventh Army and Fifth Panzer Army,
while II SS Panzer Corps (composed of the remnants of four panzer divisions)
held the north of the escape route against the British and Canadians and
XLVII Panzer Corps (the remnants of two panzer divisions) held the south
against the Americans.
Closing the Gap

German counterattacks against Canadian-Polish
positions on 20 August 1944.  For the Allies time
was the critical factor in blocking the German
army's escape, but with the Americans held at
Argentan and the Canadian advance towards Trun
proceeding slowly, by 17 August the encirclement
was still incomplete.  General Stanisław Maczek's
Polish 1st Armoured Division (part of the First
Canadian Army) was broken into four battle groups
and ordered to make a wide sweep to the south-
east to join up with the Americans at Chambois.
Trun fell to the Canadian 4th Armoured Division on
18 August.Having captured Champeaux, on 19
August all four Polish battle groups converged on
Chambois and reinforced by the 4th Armoured, by
the evening the Poles had secured the town and
linked up with the US 90th and French 2nd
Armoured Divisions.  However, although the arms
of the encirclement were now in contact, the Allies
were not yet astride Seventh Army's escape route in
any great strength and their positions came under
frenzied assault.  During the day an armoured
column from the 2nd Panzer Division broke through
the Canadians in St. Lambert, taking half the village
and keeping a road open for six hours until it was
closed again towards nightfall.  Many Germans
escaped along this route, and numerous small
parties infiltrated through to the Dives during the
night.
The Aftermath

German forces surrendering in St. Lambert on 21 August 1944.By 22 August, all German
forces west of the Allied lines were dead or in captivity.  Historians differ in their estimates
of German losses in the pocket; the majority state that between 80,000 to 100,000 troops
were caught in the encirclement of which 10,000 to 15,000 were killed, 45,000 to 50,000
taken prisoner, and around 20,000 escaped.  In the northern sector alone, German
material losses included 344 tanks, self-propelled guns and other light armoured vehicles,
as well as 2,447 soft-skinned vehicles and 252 guns abandoned or destroyed. In the
fighting around Hill 262, German losses totalled 2,000 killed and 5,000 taken prisoner, in
addition to 55 tanks, 44 guns and 152 other armoured vehicles. The once-powerful 12th
SS Panzer Division had lost 94 percent of its armour, nearly all of its artillery, and 70
percent of its vehicles. Mustering close to 20,000 men and 150 tanks before the
Normandy campaign, after Falaise it was reduced to 300 men and 10 tanks. Although
elements of several German formations had managed to escape to the east, even these
had left behind most of their equipment.  After the battle, Allied investigators estimated
that the Germans lost around 500 tanks and assault guns in the pocket, and very little of
the equipment that was extricated survived the general retreat across the Seine.

Disappointed that a significant portion of Seventh Army had eluded them, many in the
Allied higher echelons—particularly among the Americans—were bitterly critical of what
they perceived as Montgomery's lack of urgency in closing the pocket.  Some historians
agree that the gap could have been closed earlier.  Wilmot notes that despite having
British divisions in reserve Montgomery did not reinforce Simonds, and neither was the
Canadian drive on Trun and Chambois as "vigorous and venturesome" as the situation
demanded.  Hastings writes that Montgomery, having witnessed what he characterises as
a poor Canadian performance during Totalize, should have brought up veteran British
divisions to take the lead.  However, while acknowledging that Montgomery and Crerar
might have done more to impart momentum to the British and Canadians, these and
others such as D'Este and Blumenson dismiss as "absurd over-simplification" Patton's
post-battle claim that the Americans could have prevented the German escape had
Bradley not ordered him to stop at Argentan.  Patton's troops did not take Argentan until
20 August—the day after the Poles and Canadians captured Chambois—and the
American unit that closed the gap between Argentan and Chambois, the 90th Division,
was according to Hastings one of the least effective of any Allied army in Normandy. He
speculates that the real reason Bradley halted Patton was not fears over accidental
clashes with the British but an appreciation that with powerful German formations still
effective at that stage of the battle, the Americans lacked the means to defend an early
blocking position and would have suffered an "embarrassing and gratuitous setback" at
the hands of the retreating Fallschirmjäger and 2nd and 12th SS Panzer Divisions.

The battle of the Falaise Gap marked the closing phase of the Battle of Normandy with a
decisive German defeat.  Hitler's personal involvement had been damaging from the first,
with his insistence on hopelessly optimistic counter-offensives, his micro-management of
his generals, and his refusal to countenance a withdrawal when his armies were
threatened with annihilation.  More than 40 German divisions were destroyed during the
Battle of Normandy, while 450,000 men had been lost, of whom 240,000 were killed or
wounded. The Allies had achieved this at a cost of 209,672 casualties, including 36,976
killed. The final battle of Operation Overlord—the Liberation of Paris—followed on 25
August, and Overlord reached its effective end by 30 August with the retreat of the last
German unit across the Seine.
Günther “Hans” von Kluge

(30 October 1882 – 19 August 1944) was a
German military leader.  Von Kluge rose to
the rank of field marshal in the
Wehrmacht.   By 1936 he was a lieutenant-
general and in 1937 took command of the
Sixth Army Group.  As commander of the
Sixth Army Group, which became the
German Fourth Army, von Kluge led the
Sixth into battle in Poland in 1939. Though
he opposed the initial German plan to
attack westwards into France, he led the
Fourth Army in its attack through the
Ardennes that culminated in the fall of
France.
In June and July 1944, during the invasion of Normandy by Allied forces,
Rommel commanded Army Group B under Field Marshal von Rundstedt.
Rommel was charged with planning German counterattacks intended to
drive the Allied forces back to the beaches. On July 2, von Kluge replaced
von Rundstedt, because von Rundstedt was advocating negotiation with the
Allies. Two weeks later, Rommel was wounded and von Kluge took over as
commander of Army Group B as well.

He was recalled to Berlin for a meeting with Hitler after Stauffenberg’s failed
coup.  Thinking that Hitler would punish him as a conspirator, he committed
suicide by taking cyanide near the First World War battlefield of Verdun. He
left Hitler a letter in which he advised Hitler to make peace and “
put an end to
a hopeless struggle when necessary...”
Having taken Chambois, two of the four Polish battlegroups drove north-east and established themselves on
Hill 262 (Mont Ormel), spending the night of 19 August entrenching the lines of approach to the hill. The following
morning Field Marshal Model renewed his attempts to force open an egress, ordering elements of the 2nd and
9th SS Panzer Divisions to attack from outside the pocket towards the Polish positions on Hill 262.  Around
midday several units of the 10th SS, 12th SS, and 116th Panzer Divisions managed to break through the weak
Polish lines and open a corridor, while the 9th SS Panzer Division prevented the Canadians from intervening.  By
mid afternoon about 10,000 German troops had passed out of the pocket.

Polish Infantry moving towards cover on Mont Ormel, 20 August 1944.Despite being isolated and coming under
further strong attacks the Poles clung on to Mont Ormel, which they referred to as "The Mace". Although they
lacked the fighting power to close the corridor, they were able from their vantage point to direct artillery fire on to
the retreating Germans, exacting a deadly toll.  Exasperated by the losses to his men, Colonel General Paul
Hausser—commanding the Seventh Army—ordered the Polish positions to be "eliminated".  Substantial forces,
including the remnants of the 352nd Infantry Division and several battle groups from the 2nd SS Panzer Division,
inflicted heavy casualties on the 8th and 9th Battalions of the Polish 1st Armoured Division, but the assault was
eventually beaten off. Their stand cost the Poles almost all of their ammunition and left them in a precarious
position.  Lacking the means to intervene, they were forced to watch as the remnants of the XLVII Panzer Corps
escaped the pocket. After the brutality of the day's combat nightfall was welcomed by both sides. With contact
being avoided, fighting during the night was sporadic, although the Poles continued to call down frequent artillery
strikes to disrupt the ongoing German retreat from the sector.

Although not as coordinated as previously, German attacks on Hill 262 resumed the following morning. The
Polish position came close to being overrun, and in repelling the Germans the tanks were forced to use the last
of their ammunition. At approximately 12:00 noon the final attempt on the positions of the 9th Battalion was
launched by the last SS remnants, which was defeated at close quarters. Surrounded for three days and under
almost constant attack, the Polish casualties for the Battle of Mont Ormel were 325 killed, 1,002 wounded, and
114 missing—approximately 20 percent of the Polish 1st Armoured Division's combat strength.  Within the hour,
the Canadian Grenadier Guards had reached what remained of Mont Ormel's defenders, and by late afternoon
the remainder of the 2nd and 9th SS Panzer Divisions had begun their retreat to the Seine.

By evening of 21 August, tanks of the Canadian 4th Armoured Division had linked with Polish forces at
Coudehard, while the Canadian 3rd and 4th Infantry Divisions had secured St. Lambert and the northern
passage to Chambois. The Falaise pocket had been sealed.